MiDire

The flag oil company is adjusting again. YPF confirmed this Wednesday, May 13, that from midnight on Thursday its fuels will cost 1% more throughout the country. The news, although contained in its percentage, comes loaded with context: it is the first official price movement since the beginning of the war in the Middle East and anticipates new turbulence on the Argentine energy horizon.

The announcement was made by the president and CEO of the company, Horacio Marín, through his social networks, in a message that combined the austerity of technical language with a wink to consumers: along with the 1% increase, he confirmed an extension of the 'price buffer' mechanism for 45 more days, the shield that YPF uses not to directly transfer the fluctuations of the international barrel to the pump.

The measure did not fall from the sky. It is the result of weeks of cross-pressure between the escalation of Brent oil – which has been consistently trading above USD 100 since the end of February – the contraction in consumption registered in the interior of the country and the need of Javier Milei's government to sustain the disinflationary narrative that has been the axis of its economic management.

With a market share of more than 55%, YPF is not just another company: it is the thermometer that sets the pace at which the entire industry moves. When the state oil company rises, Axion Energy and Shell usually follow. When it freezes, the sector also moderates. For this reason, Marín's every move is read in macroeconomic terms, not just in business terms.

To understand why this Thursday's 1% matters, you have to look at the road traveled. The following is the complete history of fuel increases in 2026, reconstructed with data from consulting firms, specialized media and pump records:

The most revealing photo is provided by a field data from Trelew, Chubut: in January 2026, the liter of super gasoline marked $ 1,040 at YPF. As of May 5, that same station marked $1,906. A jump of 83.27% – equivalent to $866 more per liter – in just four months. With the 1% on May 14, the number is already around 85% of the cumulative increase since January.

The fuel price index of the consulting firm EcoGo (base January 2025 = 100) confirms this with another perspective: the indicator went from 136.3 on February 26 to 167.8 on April 27, 2026, a rise of 22.9% in just two months. The biggest jump occurred in the first half of March, when the war in the Middle East became a structural variable in the global energy market.

Note: YPF values are estimated after applying 1% on May 13 prices. Those of competitors reflect the survey of the last week and may vary according to time and season. Source: Infobae / EcoGo.

The mechanism that YPF baptized as the 'price buffer' – or buffer – is, in essence, a voluntary decision by the company not to transfer to the pump the sudden variations of the Brent barrel during a certain period. It is not a legal freeze or a regulation of the State: it is a commercial promise of the company to its customers.

How does it work in practice? YPF internally creates a 'clearing account': when Brent rises and the company absorbs that difference without passing it on to the price, the debt is recorded. When the barrel goes down – or when the buffer period ends – the company will be able to recover that margin with future adjustments, as long as the market allows it.

The first buffer was activated on April 1, 2026, when the pumps in the interior showed a worrying drop in consumption. The decision also served as a signal to the market: other companies moderated their pace of adjustment by taking the position of the sector leader as a reference. Now, 45 days later – and just 27 days after the original announcement, which implies that the buffer was cut prematurely – YPF makes the small adjustment of 1% and relaunches the mechanism for another round of 45 days.

The unknown is what will happen when this new deadline, projected for June 28, 2026, expires. It all depends on Hormuz.

No analysis of local prices makes sense without understanding the geography of the conflict that is shaping them. Since February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched military operations on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz – a strategic corridor through which about 20% of the world's oil and gas trade transits – has been practically paralyzed.

The effect was immediate: the barrel of Brent, which closed at USD 73.20 on February 27, climbed to USD 102 in the following days. By April 30, when the government published Decree 302/2026 updating taxes, Brent was already touching USD 122 intraday – its highest level since March 2022 – and WTI was above USD 108. Trump, according to AFP, had declared that the naval blockade of Iran was "more effective than bombing".

For Argentina, the shock has a positive side that analysts do not lose sight of: higher international energy prices could improve export revenues by up to USD 5,000 million during 2026, according to Daniel Dreizzen of Aleph Energy. Vaca Muerta, in this scenario, becomes a strategic asset of the first order.

💸 THE BLOW TO THE POCKETBOOK: INFLATION, CONSUMPTION AND PURCHASING POWER

Fuels account for 3.8% of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). At first glance, it seems little. But the knock-on effect is devastating: gasoline and diesel are not only consumed in the car's tank; they are transferred to freight, food, passenger transport, the cost of almost any good that requires distribution.

Every 10% increase at the pumps impacts 0.36 percentage points directly on the CPI, according to analysts from the Economy & Energy team. In March 2026, the average increase was 7.3%, which added at least 0.3 points to the monthly indicator at a time when the government was betting on showing downward inflation.

The consumption data confirms the diagnosis: in March 2026, fuel sales fell 1.8% year-on-year and 3.1% in the daily average compared to February, according to the Ministry of Energy. The fall hit differently: super gasoline fell 4.1% year-on-year, while premium versions – consumed by sectors with greater purchasing power – grew 2.7%. A market that is segmented is a market that bleeds from below.

YPF was the only large company to overcome this trend with year-on-year growth (+1%), thanks to its more contained pricing policy. With 55.4% of the volume marketed in March, the oil company showed that moderation has commercial benefits, at least for the duration of the war.

The question that no one can answer with certainty, but that everyone is trying: how far will the price of fuel go in Argentina? The answer depends on variables that are linked together: the evolution of Brent, the duration of the conflict in the Middle East, the government's fiscal policy and YPF's commercial decisions.

Analysts at Economía & Energía pointed out in April that prices at the pump "have not yet reached values that allow us to face an export parity price of crude oil close to USD 100 per barrel." That means, in simple terms, that there is a price lag that the market will eventually want to correct. The refiners themselves speak of a gap of between 20% and 25%.

The buffer that expires around June 28, 2026 will be the moment of truth. YPF said that it will evaluate 'how to incorporate the price increases in case they occur in a scenario of war and volatility'. The clearing account accumulated during the buffer months must be settled in some way.

An additional element to monitor: Decree 302/2026 deferred the remaining tax increases of the CPI for the first half of the year until June. That means that an additional tax hike on gasoline and diesel is already scheduled for next month, regardless of what happens with Brent. The perfect storm could arrive in July.

Milei's government, caught between its disinflationary commitment and the logic of a deregulated energy market, has little room for direct action. It can continue to postpone taxes – as it did in May – and trust that YPF will maintain its role as price anchor. But every day that Brent remains above $100, that bet comes at a cost that eventually someone will pay: the company or the consumer.

The Executive's strategy in the face of the energy shock was not reduced to delegating to YPF. There were at least three additional measures that went almost unnoticed in the public debate:

● Tax postponement: The government avoided applying the planned tax increases on fuels in April. It moved them to May (Decree 302/2026) and promised to apply only 0.5% in that month, with the rest deferred to June.

● Flexibility of ethanol cuts: The Ministry of Energy authorized a voluntary increase in the percentage of ethanol in gasoline to 15% – above the mandatory minimum – with the explicit objective of reducing domestic costs in the face of the oil shock.

● Relaxation of quality standards: The government took measures to temporarily relax some fuel quality standards, allowing blends that lower the cost of production without affecting the general operation of the vehicle fleet.

● Active micropricing: YPF maintained its system of daily micro-adjustments differentiated by schedule, corridor and region, optimizing margins without applying visible generalized increases.

🏷️ Keywords: #YPF2026 #AumentoCombustibles #PrecioNafta #BufferYPF #InflacionArgentina #GuerraIran #PetroleoBrent #EconomiaArgentina #SaludDelBolsillo #NaftaMayo2026

The case for alleged illicit enrichment involving the Chief of Staff continues to generate headlines, statements and tension in the Casa Rosada

From the statement of a contractor who claims to have received $245,000 in cash without issuing a single invoice, to the lifting of tax secrecy by Judge Ariel Lijo, to the indictment of former chief adviser Demian Reidel for the use of corporate cards of Nucleoeléctrica Argentina: the ruling party is facing a judicial storm with its epicenter in the office of the man who was the face of the government before the press.

This is the complete coverage of the case, with the facts verified, the protagonists identified and the map of the political repercussions that continue to grow.

The cause was not born overnight. Its roots go back to irregularities detected in the evolution of the assets of the civil servant during the exercise of his office:

The heart of the investigation are five properties that the Justice has on its radar, distributed between the Federal Capital, the suburbs and the Province of Buenos Aires. The operations show a pattern that prosecutor Pollicita seeks to reconstruct with precision: an evolution of assets that would not coincide with the declared income of the official.

The properties investigated include the lot in the country Indio Cuá (Exaltación de la Cruz), an apartment in Caballito acquired as an official, a property on Asamblea Avenue mortgaged in November 2025, and a property in La Plata where the official's mother resides.

The most resonant chapter came with the statement of contractor Matías Tabar, who upon leaving Comodoro Py handed over his cell phone to the Justice. Inside the device: WhatsApp conversations with Adorni himself.

According to reconstructions published by Clarín and El Economista, the Chief of Staff would have contacted Tabar before his testimony. The dialogue exhibited to the investigators includes at least one message that set off alarms in the court: "All this is political," Adorni reportedly told the builder. Tabar, advised by lawyers, cut off the communication: "They told me that we don't have to have any more communication between us."

"Let's tell the whole truth."
— Adorni to Tabar — WhatsApp message analyzed by the Justice

The sequence of chats prompted Congresswoman Marcela Pagano — who had already denounced the Nucleoeléctrica case — to request Adorni's preventive detention, applying the Irurzun doctrine: the judicial precedent that enabled the preventive detention of officials due to the risk of hindering the investigation using their institutional power.

The short answer is: not immediately. Constitutionalists consulted by El Cronista explain that, since the Chief of Staff is an official susceptible to impeachment, the immunity law first requires his dismissal so that he can be arrested. The mechanism is the "motion of censure" of Article 101, never applied since it was established in the constitutional reform of 1994.

He can, however, be called for questioning. And if the investigation advances towards a formal indictment, the expert report of Tabar's cell phone and the reports of the DATIF will be decisive.

On the same day that Adorni broke the silence in a streaming, federal prosecutor Ramiro González issued a resolution that added a new layer to the scandal: the indictment of Demian Reidel, former chief of advisors to President Javier Milei and former director of Nucleoeléctrica Argentina S.A., the state-owned company in charge of managing the country's nuclear power plants.

The paradox is huge: the expenses that led to the indictment were exposed in the management report that Manuel Adorni presented to the Chamber of Deputies. The document, of more than 50 pages, details operations with corporate cards in pesos and dollars that include consumption in nightclubs in Madrid, beach services in Valencia, hairdressers, free shops, clothing stores, hotels and restaurants in cities such as Amsterdam, Miami, Singapore, Rio de Janeiro and Vienna.

Reidel, through his account on the social network X, denied having made personal expenses with the corporate card. He stated that the articles mix data from all the company's cards and that trying to assign the consumption to it is "absolute bad faith".

The company, meanwhile, reacted immediately: its new president, Juan Martín Campos, announced the elimination of the use of corporate cards for trips at Nucleoeléctrica Argentina. A gesture that, paradoxically, shows that the mechanism existed and that no one had questioned it before.

It took the government almost two months to admit what the pollsters were already showing: the Adorni case had a negative impact on the image indicators of the libertarian administration. An Ad Hoc study counted 2.5 million mentions of Adorni in the last 59 days. An analysis by Monitor Digital indicates that controversy concentrates 41.15% of the mentions of the Executive, well above the $LIBRA cause (29.05%) and the ANDIS cause (11.59%).

The drop in President Milei's image exceeds 10 points, especially among his electoral hard core, according to government sources consulted by Infobae. A single day — that of Tabar's testimony — generated more than 124,000 mentions of the Chief of Staff on social networks.

"It's not linear, but the joke is very easy."
— Source from the libertarian environment — cited by Infobae

One of the most commented episodes of the week was the message of Vice President Victoria Villarruel on her social networks. Although he did not make direct accusations or mention the Adorni case explicitly, different political sectors interpreted his publication as a gesture of distance at a time when the crisis of the Chief of Staff is beginning to impact the image of the Government.

Villarruel's message was added to a series of signals within the ruling party that generate concern about the internal cohesion of the triangle of power that surrounds the President.

The Peronist bloc in Congress announced the promotion of a motion of censure against Adorni, a mechanism provided for in Article 101 of the National Constitution but never applied since its creation in 1994. The mechanism would require an absolute majority of the Chamber of Deputies to remove the Chief of Staff.

For her part, Deputy Pagano escalated her judicial offensive: after promoting the complaints for Nucleoeléctrica, she presented the arrest request based on the Irurzun doctrine, arguing that Adorni would have pressured the witness Tabar through WhatsApp and offered benefits to modify his testimony.

One of the most striking elements of the judicial saga is that the expenses of Nucleoeléctrica's corporate cards came to light through the management report that Adorni presented to Congress. The document, conceived as an exercise in institutional transparency, became the link that connected the Chief of Staff with a new case and with the indictment of his former colleague Reidel.

Tabar's situation also illuminates a well-known judicial dynamic: the witness who delivers compromising evidence, including private communications of the investigated, can become the axis of the entire case. The expert examination of the contractor's cell phone and the analysis of his conversations with Adorni will set the pace of the file in the coming weeks.

Criminal lawyers consulted by specialized media agree that the case "will surely escalate" and that Adorni's public explanations "further complicate his situation." Lawyer Lucas Bianco, of the Association of Criminal Lawyers, was more direct: he considered an eventual prosecution "almost imminent".

Adorni occupies an ambiguous institutional position: he is both the government's media spokesman and its second-highest-ranking official. His removal would require a process that the government cannot promote without acknowledging the damage, while his permanence continues to fuel an image crisis that erodes the president's political capital.

At Casa Rosada they are confident that the 2026 World Cup and the economic rebound will change the cycle. "Manuel is firm and stays," they repeat from the nucleus near Milei. But Justice advances at its own pace.

"Justice is going to clarify everything. And I'm going to talk a lot there."
— Manuel Adorni, Chief of Staff

The Adorni case is, in many ways, the reflection of a contradiction that runs through Milei's government: the promise of transparency and "chainsaw" to public spending collides with a judicial reality that involves figures of the Executive itself in investigations for unjustified expenses, corporate cards used in luxury destinations and properties acquired with funds of unaccredited origin.

The case is still open. The expert examination of Tabar's cell phone, the analysis of the DATIF, the pending statements of new witnesses and the eventual formal prosecution will mark the next chapters of a file that, as the Government itself admits, shows no signs of cooling down.

The case will continue in lower instances, generating tension in the ruling party. Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz signed the unanimous ruling that declared inadmissible the extraordinary appeal of the Attorney General's Office.

The per saltum – literally, 'leap of instance' in Latin – is an exceptional procedural mechanism that allows the Supreme Court to intervene directly in a judicial case without waiting for the usual route through the lower instances. It is, in other words, a legal shortcut enabled only in circumstances of extreme institutional urgency.

Article 257 bis of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of the Nation establishes the requirements for its admissibility: that the case be processed under federal jurisdiction and that a 'notorious institutional gravity' is accredited. Both conditions must be met simultaneously. It is not enough to allege urgency or to maintain that the matter under discussion is of public importance.

❝ The per saltum is the last emergency tool of the Argentine judicial system. It is only enabled when the institutional gravity is manifest and the damage irreparable through ordinary channels.

In this case, the Attorney General's Office of the Treasury – the body that legally represents the national State – went to the per saltum on April 16, after the labor judge Raúl Horacio Ojeda of the National Labor Court No. 63 issued a precautionary measure that suspended the application of 82 articles of the labor reform. The Government argued that the situation was institutionally serious and asked the Court to rule without waiting for the exhaustion of ordinary remedies.

The text of the ruling is forceful and concise, as is usually the language of the highest court when it rejects an appeal in limine. The three judges who signed the resolution – Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz – maintained:

The resolution was accompanied, according to judicial sources consulted by the main media, by an additional consideration: the Executive's request was also 'unofficial' since the labor reform was already in force at the time of the ruling. In effect, Chamber VIII of the National Labor Appeals Chamber had restored the full validity of the articles suspended on April 23, by granting suspensive effect to the appeal of the national State.

✅ Law 27.802 on Labor Modernization is currently IN FORCE. The Court considered that, given this context, the per saltum was additionally 'unofficial'.

From the procedural perspective, the Court's decision does not imply a substantive pronouncement on the constitutionality of the labor reform. The highest court did not evaluate whether or not the law is compatible with the National Constitution: it simply determined that the path chosen by the Government to access that definition – per saltum – did not meet the legal requirements to be admitted.

🕰️ Chronology of the conflict: from the sanction of the law to judicial rejection

To understand the scope of today's ruling, it is essential to reconstruct the procedural itinerary that led the Court to pronounce. The judicial saga of Law 27,802 is one of the most complex constitutional litigations of the year.

The Labor Modernization Law – published in the Official Gazette on March 6, 2026 – represents the most ambitious reform of Argentine labor law in decades. The text modifies the Employment Contract Law (No. 20,744), repeals the Telework Law and intervenes in more than thirty different regulations of the labor legal system.

Among its most controversial provisions are changes in the system of severance pay, modifications to union regulations, alterations to the social security system and the repeal of articles linked to the protection of the worker. From the Executive, the reform was presented as an instrument of deregulation necessary to generate employment and reduce labor litigation.

It was precisely this collision of arguments that led the CGT to file, days after the publication of the law, an action declaring unconstitutionality before the Labor Justice. The union, represented by its general secretaries Sola, Argüello and Jerónimo, maintained that the challenged articles modify the current labor regime and violate constitutional rights and guarantees.

Judge Raúl Horacio Ojeda, head of the National Labor Court No. 63, became the unexpected protagonist of this institutional conflict. On March 30, 2026, Ojeda accepted the precautionary measure requested by the CGT and suspended the questioned articles with general scope – a decision that set off alarms in the Casa Rosada and triggered the judicial strategy of the Executive.

Ojeda is a labor judge of first instance with a background in the Ministry of Labor during the Kirchner administration, where he served as chief adviser to then-Minister Juan Carlos Tomada. His profile was questioned by the ruling party, which pointed out alleged incompatibilities and sought to remove him from the file by questioning his competence to hear a case of these characteristics.

⚠️ Judge Ojeda resisted the orders of the Chamber to refer the file to the federal administrative litigation jurisdiction, a situation that forced the court to issue a peremptory order of 24 hours with authorization of non-working days.

The government's strategy to remove Ojeda was successful at the procedural level: the National Court of Appeals in Federal Administrative Litigation ruled that the case should be processed in its jurisdiction because it is a matter that exceeds classic labor law and involves the validity of a national law. The change of jurisdiction restricts the margin of action of the CGT, which had achieved its main judicial victory in the labor field.

The Court's decision was received in the ruling party as a new front of judicial tension, although government spokesmen tried to minimize its impact by pointing out that the labor reform remains fully in force. However, analysts and political operators agree that the rejection of the per saltum implies a relevant procedural defeat for the Executive.

❝ The Government loses the possibility of obtaining a quick and definitive definition from the Court. The legal uncertainty about the labour reform has been going on indefinitely.

The official strategy had a clear objective: to obtain from the Supreme Court a substantive definition that would shield the law against future judicial questions. When the per saltum is rejected, that objective is postponed and the case will have to go through the ordinary path – which can last for months or even years – before eventually reaching the highest court through the common route.

From the CGT, meanwhile, there was a nuanced reading. Sources from the labor federation told La Nacion that the highest court could have resolved the issue, and recalled that there are still pending pronouncements in the Labor Chamber, where the challenges of its members are being processed.

The Argentine Rural Society also has a presence in the litigation: it appeared before the courts to support the validity of Law 27,802 and request that its application not be suspended, showing the political-economic weight that the reform has for the business sector.

With the per saltum rejected, the case is filed in the Federal Administrative Court No. 12, which must resolve the substance of the conflict: whether or not the challenged articles of Law 27,802 are compatible with the National Constitution. That resolution — which is expected to be appealed by any of the losing parties — could eventually reach the Supreme Court through the ordinary route.

Meanwhile, the labor reform is in force and employers and workers must adjust their relations to the new regulations, although with the uncertainty that the legal scenario could change if the federal court adopts a precautionary measure of suspension or orders the unconstitutionality of the questioned articles.

Beyond the immediate political result, the Court's ruling has legal implications that deserve a detailed analysis. Firstly, the highest court ratifies the exceptional nature of per saltum as a procedural tool: it is not enough that the case is important or that the Executive has an interest in a quick resolution. A 'notorious institutional gravity' is required, which, in this context, the judges considered that it was not duly accredited.

Second, the additional consideration of the 'inofficiousness' of the appeal reveals a pragmatic view: if the law was already in force at the time of ruling, the urgent basis that justifies the per saltum vanishes. The Court, in this sense, not only rejected the appeal for formal reasons, but also for reasons of procedural opportunity.

Third, it is relevant to note that the judgment was signed by only three of the five members of the Court. Judges Juan Carlos Maqueda and Ricardo Lorenzetti – the latter is a signatory – are the five members of the court. The absence of the signature of any of the justices may respond to reasons of recusal, excuse or simple coincidence of agenda, but it could be significant if the case eventually reaches the highest court through the ordinary route.

❝ The rejection of the per saltum does not define the constitutionality of the labor reform. It is a procedural defeat for the government, not a substantive defeat for the validity of Law 27,802.

Scenario 1: The federal administrative jurisdiction rules in favor of constitutionality

If Federal Court No. 12 and eventually the Contentious Administrative Chamber validate the constitutionality of the law, the CGT could file an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court, which in that case would intervene through the ordinary channels. This scenario is the most favorable for the government.

Nothing prevents the new court hearing the case from issuing a new precautionary measure that suspends – again – the articles in question. In that case, the government could appeal again and the cycle would be repeated, although now in the federal jurisdiction.

The labor federation has already indicated that it raised the unconstitutionality of the law of precautionary measures against the State that empowered the Federal Court to resolve questions of jurisdiction. If that challenge succeeds, the file could return to the labor jurisdiction, reversing the procedural progress achieved by the Government.

In the context of the parity negotiations and the political dynamics, a scenario of understanding that unlocks the conflict through legislative or regulatory modifications to the most controversial articles of the law cannot be ruled out.

Per saltum is an exceptional procedural remedy that allows the Supreme Court to intervene directly in a case without waiting for the exhaustion of intermediate instances. It is regulated in Article 257 bis of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure and only applies when there is 'notorious institutional gravity'. It is a tool of very restricted use in Argentine judicial practice.

The Court declared the appeal 'inadmissible' on the grounds that the requirements of Article 257 bis of the CPCCN were not met. Additionally, it pointed out that the request was 'unofficial' since Law 27,802 was already in force at the time of resolution, which made the urgent intervention that the Government demanded unnecessary.

Yes. The law has been fully in force since April 23, 2026, when Chamber VIII of the National Labor Appeals Chamber granted suspensive effect to the State's appeal, lifting Judge Ojeda's precautionary measure. The rejection of per saltum does not change this situation.

The CGT challenged more than 80 articles of the law that, according to the labor federation, modify the employment contract regime, union rules, the social security system and access to labor justice in a regressive manner. He argued that these changes violate the principle of progressivity of social rights and freedom of association, both with constitutional support.

The ruling was signed by Horacio Rosatti (president of the Court), Ricardo Lorenzetti and Carlos Rosenkrantz. The three make up the Supreme Court and formed a unanimous decision in the rejection of the extraordinary appeal by leap of instance presented by the Attorney General's Office.

The file continues its processing in the Federal Administrative Court No. 12, which must resolve the substance of the conflict: whether or not the questioned articles of Law 27,802 are constitutional. That decision may be appealed and eventually reach the Supreme Court through the ordinary route.

⚖️ A ruling that defines the pace of the case, not its final destination

The rejection of per saltum by the Supreme Court is not the end point of the judicial saga around Law 27,802. It is, rather, a sign that the highest court is not willing to be used as an express arbiter of disputes that still have a path in the lower instances. The labor reform is still in force, the CGT is not resigning its legal strategy, and the contentious-administrative jurisdiction will now have to bear the weight of a decision that will define the Argentine labor map in the coming years. The Court, meanwhile, waits.

Editorial illustration — RIGI • Incentive Regime for Large Investments • Law 27.742 • Argentina 2024–2026

Keywords: RIGI Argentina • Incentive Regime for Large Investments • Law 27742 • Law of Bases • foreign investment • Vaca Muerta • mining • VPU • fiscal stability 30 years • ICSID • tax benefits Argentina 2026

The Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) is a promotional program created by Articles 164 to 228 of Title VII of Law 27,742, sanctioned on June 28, 2024 and published in the Official Gazette on July 8, 2024. It is part of the so-called "Law of Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentines", the largest package of structural reforms of the government of Javier Milei. The RIGI was regulated by Decree 749/2024 (August 2024) and complemented by AFIP General Resolution 5590/2024 and Decree 940/2024. In February 2026, Decree 105/2026 extended the deadline for membership until 8 July 2027.

The logic of the RIGI is based on a clear diagnosis: Argentina has enormous potential in natural resources and energy – lithium, copper, oil, gas, renewables – but lacks the private investment to develop them at scale. The cost of capital in the country is prohibitively high due to the history of regulatory, exchange rate and tax instability. The RIGI seeks to "advance" macroeconomic solutions that under normal conditions would require decades, offering investors a predictable legal and fiscal environment for 30 years.

The backbone of the RIGI is the Single Project Vehicle (VPU). To access the regime, investors must constitute a legal entity whose sole and exclusive purpose is to carry out the approved project. The VPU can take the form of a commercial company, a branch of a foreign company, a temporary union (UTE) or other associative contracts. The rule is strict: the VPU cannot have assets or activities outside the project, except those strictly necessary for the administration of funds.

One variant is the "dedicated branch": a company already operating in Argentina can create a branch specific to the RIGI project, isolating those assets from the rest of its operations. This figure allows multinationals already established in the country to access the regime without dissolving their existing structure.

Stage of the process	Description	Term
1. Incorporation of the VPU	Create the unique legal entity for the project	Before the application
2. Preparation of the plan	Detail the project, sectors, schedule and investment	Variable
3. Application for membership	Submission to the Enforcement Authority	Until 8/7/2027
4. Evaluation	The Evaluation Committee analyzes the project	90 business days
5. Approval and registration	Registration in the VPU Registry	After a favorable opinion
6. Execution	At least 40% of the minimum invested in the first 2 years	Since accession
7. Progress Reports	Periodic report to the enforcement authority	According to schedule

Once approved, the VPU enjoys all the benefits of the RIGI for the life of the project. If you fail to qualify, you may be discharged from the scheme and lose accrued benefits. The execution period varies depending on the project, but the law requires that at least 40% of the minimum investment required be made within the first two years of accession.

The RIGI offers the most extensive package of tax, customs and exchange benefits in recent Argentine history

💰 Tax Benefits

🚢 Customs Benefits

💱 Exchange Benefits

⚖️ Legal Stability: 30 Years of Fixed Rules

The benefit most valued by investors is not fiscal but legal: stability for 30 years. During this period, the State guarantees that:

1. The VPU may not be affected by the repeal of the RIGI or by more burdensome regulations than those in force at the time of accession.

2. The participating provinces and municipalities may not impose new local taxes, except for remuneration rates for services effectively rendered.

3. In the event of a dispute, the investor can go directly to ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, World Bank), avoiding Argentine justice.

4. If a future rule is more beneficial to the VPU, the VPU may choose to apply it in place of the original regime.

The RIGI was the most controversial point of the Basic Law: the debate between development and sovereignty is still open in 2026

The RIGI was, from its conception, the most debated and questioned chapter of the Basic Law. The critics come from very diverse spectrums: heterodox economists, environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, research foundations such as FUNDAR and FARN, SME unions, opposition legislators and even some sectors of the local business establishment. Their objections are articulated in four main axes.

💸 The Fiscal Impact Argument

Economist Martin Reydó (Fundar) argues that the RIGI represents "the core of the government's proposal" and warns that "tax benefits minimize tax revenues; in this way, an essential way for the exploitation of natural resources to benefit the Nation as a whole is sterilized."

The exact fiscal cost of RIGI has not been officially calculated or published. Private estimates vary widely depending on the projects that are actually developed. What is clear is that the difference between the general rate of Profits (35%) and that of the RIGI (25%) implies a tax "donation" of 10 percentage points on the profits of projects that, together, could exceed USD 60,000 million.

🌱 The Environmental Issue

Article 193 of the Basic Law establishes that inputs for strategic export projects must be guaranteed "regardless of whether it affects domestic supply." Cristian Fernández (FARN) warns: "If water is affected by mining projects and, suddenly, there is a context of drought, the water supply for the communities will not matter because the water will be given to the mining companies."

Greenpeace was even more categorical in its statement of June 13, 2024, warning that the RIGI does not impose prior environmental impact assessment conditions and does not guarantee consultation with local populations or indigenous peoples, which violates the National Constitution and the international treaties on environmental and indigenous rights signed by Argentina.

⚖️ The ICSID Problem

Direct access to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the World Bank's arbitral tribunal, is one of RIGI's most controversial points. Argentina already has a painful history with that court: after the 2001 crisis, it was ordered to pay millions of dollars to foreign investors. The fact that the RIGI enshrines direct access to ICSID by law – without going through Argentine judicial instances – is interpreted by critics as a cession of legal sovereignty over resources that are owned by the State.

As of May 2026: 12 projects approved for USD 25,479 M and others for USD 37,600 M under evaluation — total in portfolio: USD 63,079 M

As of May 2026, RIGI has 12 approved projects for a total of USD 25,479 million, with another 20 projects under evaluation that would add an additional USD 37,600 million. The total in the portfolio – approved plus under evaluation – exceeds USD 63,000 million, equivalent to approximately 9% of Argentina's GDP. According to the government, these projects will generate 36,873 direct and indirect jobs.

Project	Sector	USD Investment	Province	Status
El Quemado Solar Park (YPF Luz)	Solar Energy	211 M	Mendoza	Operational
Vaca Muerta Sur (YPF + 6 companies)	Oil & Gas	2,486 M	Neuquén/Rio Negro	Under construction (51%)
Argentina LNG (Southern Energy / PAE / Golar)	Liquefied natural gas	6,878 M	Rio Negro	DFI outlet
Rincon (Rio Tinto)	Lithium (carbonate)	2,724 M	Jump	Approved
Golden Salt (Little)	Lithium (phosphate/OH/carbonate)	633 M	Jump	Approved
Mariana (Lithium Minera Arg.)	Lithium (chloride)	273 M	Jump	Approved
Gualcamayo (Minas Argentina SA)	Gold and Silver	665 m	San Juan	Approved
Los Azules (Andes Corp. Minera)	Copper	227 M	San Juan	Approved
Imps (Hoc + others)	Silver and Gold	764 M	Salta/Catamarca	Endorsement Committee
Puerto Timbúes (logistics complex)	Infrastructure	N/A	Santa Fe	Approved
Sidersa (steel mill)	Steel industry	296 m	Buenos Aires (San Nicolas)	Approved
Wind farm (GEAR SA)	Wind energy	255 m	Buenos Aires (Olavarría)	Approved

The sectoral distribution is revealing: 72-75% of the approved amounts correspond to energy and oil/gas, 24-26% to mining (lithium, copper, gold). Other sectors – industrial, logistics infrastructure – account for only 2-3% of the total. In terms of geography, San Juan leads in projected employment (12,939 positions), followed by Santa Fe (9,700 through the port of Timbúes) and Salta/Rio Negro.

The most advanced project under execution is the El Quemado Solar Park (Mendoza), which already injects energy into the national electricity system and will be the largest photovoltaic park in the country when it reaches 305 MW. The most ambitious in amount is Argentina LNG (USD 6,878 M), which would position the country as an exporter of liquefied natural gas for the first time in its history.

In February 2026, Decree 105/2026 extended the deadline for joining the RIGI for one year – from July 2026 to July 2027 – using the only extension allowed by law. The decree also expanded the sectoral scope of the regime to include the "exploitation and production of new developments of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons onshore," with a minimum investment of USD 600 million for those projects.

The Secretary of Mining, Luis Lucero, had anticipated at a sectoral event: "My personal recommendation will be to extend the RIGI, because it reflects the economic model to which we aspire: without withholdings, with lower taxes and agile procedures." The extension was interpreted by the market as a sign of continuity and solidity of the regime.

To size the RIGI package, it is convenient to compare it with the general tax regime that governs the rest of the companies in Argentina:

Concept	General Regime	RIGI (VPU)
Income Tax	35 %	25% (-10 pp)
Dividends	13 %	7% (down to 3.5% in year 7)
Adjustment for inflation	Limited	No limitations
Import tariff on inputs	Variable (up to 35%)	0% (zero tariff)
Export duties	Variable	0% (exempt from year 3)
Free availability of currencies	Restricted	100% from year 4
Debit/Credit Tax	Partially computable	100% on account Profits
Gross Income	By province	0% in adhered provinces
Asset depreciation	Normal (shelf life)	Accelerated
Tax Quebranto	Prescribes in 5 years	It does not prescribe; Transferable
Court of Disputes	Argentine justice	ICSID (optional)
Rule stability	No warranty	30 years guaranteed by law

RIGI is, in essence, a high-risk bet with high-return potential. The risk is real: ceding part of the legal and fiscal sovereignty for 30 years in strategic sectors is a decision that commits the country far beyond the government that made it. The potential benefits are also real: if projects are executed as planned, Argentina could transform its balance of payments, generate tens of thousands of jobs, and finance a development process that would otherwise have taken decades.

The first year of the RIGI – with 12 projects approved and the first meters of pipeline installed in Vaca Muerta Sur – shows that the regime has the capacity to attract capital. But it also shows its limits: the almost exclusive concentration in energy and mining, the practically zero effect on industrial employment and the paradox of negative net FDI in the same period.

The debate will remain open as long as the RIGI is in force. What seems indisputable is that this is the most significant structural reform that Argentina has attempted in terms of attracting investment since the privatizations of the 1990s, with all the promises and all the risks that this comparison entails.

📚 Sources and References

5. Infoleg — Decree 749/2024 • Regulation of RIGI (servicios.infoleg.gob.ar)

6. Argentina.gob.ar — RIGI: from today, companies will be able to apply to the regime (October 2024)

7. Argentine Embassy in Portugal — RIGI: Extension and modifications (February 2026)

8. La Nación — RIGI projects are advancing: 10 initiatives for USD 25,479 M (January 2026)

9. Infobae — The success of RIGI (December 2025) • Approved projects (December 2025)

11. Grant Thornton Argentina — RIGI: What You Need to Know (August 2024); One year after its regulation (December 2025)

12. Profile — RIGI: the doubts generated by the most controversial point of the Bases Law (June 2024)

15. Shale24 — RIGI Final Map: Approved and Pending Projects 2026 (January 2026)

16. NY Consulate (Chancellery) — RIGI Investor Guide (cnyor.cancilleria.gob.ar)

Argentina accelerates privatizations: aims for US$ 2,000 million in reserves

Transener, AySA and Belgrano Cargas, at the center of a plan promoted by Caputo that seeks to strengthen the Central Bank's reserves before the end of the year.

🗓️ May 2, 2026 ✍️ Economic Writing ⏱️ Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

The National Executive Branch deepens its strategy of state disinvestment at a pivotal moment for the Argentine macroeconomy. With the goal of accumulating international reserves set in the agreement with the IMF as a backdrop, Economy Minister Luis Caputo presented an ambitious timetable that could add US$ 2,000 million before the end of 2026. The heart of the plan is three major operations: the sale of 50% of Citelec – controlling company of Transener – the 30-year concession of AySA and the total privatization of Belgrano Cargas y Logística.

The most advanced tender – and the one with the greatest immediate impact – is that of Citelec, the controlling company that groups 50% of the state-owned Transener and Transba, the two large high-voltage electricity carriers in the country. The opening of envelopes, which took place on Tuesday, April 29, revealed three proposals totaling almost US$ 890 million, with the following distribution:

The final decision on the award will fall to the Ministry of Finance. Private sector sources pointed out that the winning bid far exceeds initial estimates, which the government interprets as a sign of market confidence in the state reform process.

In parallel with the dispute over Transener, the Ministry of Economy took a fundamental regulatory step by approving, through Resolution 543/2026 of April 28, the concession contract and share transfer model of Agua y Saneamientos Argentinos (AySA). The operation reaches 51% of the company's state shares .

The approved scheme establishes that the concession will have a term of 30 years for the provision of drinking water and sewerage service in the City of Buenos Aires and 26 municipalities of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, including La Matanza, Quilmes, Avellaneda and Lomas de Zamora, among others. The contractor must comply with the 2024-2026 Transition Plan until the end of the current year, which would guarantee the continuity of the service during the transfer stage.

📌 The tariff table and the minimum investment conditions will be defined in the bidding phase, whose call is expected for the second half of 2026.

The Executive also decreed the total privatization of Belgrano Cargas y Logística, the state-owned freight railway started in July 2025. Unlike the other processes, here the scheme contemplates separate tenders for tracks, workshops, locomotives and wagons, under an "open access" model that would allow multiple operators to enter the system.

The Belgrano, San Martín and Urquiza lines will be tendered independently. According to the Infrastructure portfolio, there is already declared interest from agro-exporters, mining companies and at least one foreign investment group. The proceeds will go to rail infrastructure through a dedicated trust, designed to shield funds from discretionary use.

Privatizations are not an isolated phenomenon: they are a commitment made by Argentina when it signed an Extended Facilities program with the IMF in April 2025, with total disbursements projected at US$ 20,000 million. The agreement establishes strict goals for the accumulation of reserves, and one of the sources of financing envisaged is precisely the extraordinary income derived from the sale or concession of state assets.

Minister Caputo himself stressed that the divestment plan contributes to a broader objective of fiscal sustainability without resorting to the Central Bank's reserves. The consulting firm PwC remarked, in a recent report, that these revenues are key to sustaining fiscal balance in a context of reduced tax pressure.

The Bases Law, passed in July 2024, enabled the transfer of eight state-owned companies to the private sector. The plan started with the ambition of privatizing 41 companies, although only eight received legislative authorization. Here is the status of each one:

The privatization program of Javier Milei's government presents a double-edged equation. On the one hand, the injection of private currency would relieve the pressure on the Central Bank's reserves without generating monetary issuance, a central argument in the official narrative. On the other hand, the speed of the process raises questions about the regulatory quality of the contracts and the capacity of the State to guarantee affordable rates for essential services such as drinking water.

The "open access" scheme in Belgrano Cargas represents a commitment to competition between operators, although specialists in the sector warn that the fragmentation of the system could hinder operational coordination. In the case of AySA, the 30-year duration of the concession generates debates about tariff review mechanisms and the investments committed in sewage infrastructure.

In any case, political timing also matters: with the legislative elections of October 2025 already over and the agreement with the IMF as an umbrella of credibility, the Executive has a window of opportunity to move forward without the vetoes of Congress that stopped the original plan of 41 companies.

⚠️ Editorial note: This article was prepared for informative and journalistic purposes based on verified public sources as of May 2, 2026. The figures may vary as the bidding process progresses.

For the first time in decades, the corridors of the Casa Rosada woke up without a journalistic presence. What began as a criminal complaint against two TN journalists led to the total closure of the historic Balcarce 50 Press Room, unleashing an institutional crisis unprecedented in Argentina's democratic history and an escalation that has already reached the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

On Sunday, April 19, the program "And tomorrow what?", hosted by Luciana Geuna and broadcast by the Todo Noticias (TN) signal, broadcast a report designed to portray the daily functioning of the Casa Rosada and the power dynamics between the sectors of the Government: those close to Karina Milei and those close to Santiago Caputo.

The chronicler Ignacio Salerno made the tour using smart glasses with a built-in camera. During the report, the journalist himself explained that he used this device so that viewers could see what a day inside the government palace is like. The video showed common corridors, classrooms, the office of Cabinet Chief Manuel Adorni and that of Eduardo "Lule" Menem, Karina Milei's bishop.

For the Government, this material constituted a violation of security regulations. The Military House maintained in its criminal complaint that the filming exposed surveillance systems, communication equipment and access control devices, providing intelligence on the President's movements. The judicial text invoked articles 222 and 223 of the Penal Code, which contemplate penalties of one to six years in prison for obtaining or revealing political or military secrets.

The government's reaction was immediate and of unprecedented forcefulness. On Thursday, April 24, without prior notice, the Ministry of Communication removed the fingerprints of around 60 accredited journalists from different national and international media from the biometric access system. The extensions to accreditations that had been in force since 2025 were suspended indefinitely.

President Javier Milei himself reacted through his account on the social network X with a message that set off alarms in newsrooms and press defense organizations: he described journalists as "disgusting garbage" and "criminals", and validated messages from libertarian accounts that affirmed that Argentines do not need a press room in the Casa Rosada. Milei described the closure of the room as an "excellent" measure. He later posted photos of journalists on his social networks, in what FOPEA described as an act of personal harassment.

The measure did not come out of nowhere: approximately three weeks before the total shutdown, the government had already withdrawn accreditations from journalists from C5N, A24, El Destape, Ámbito Financiero, Tiempo Argentino and Radio La Patriada, linking them to an alleged Russian intelligence operation in 2024. According to FOPEA, by the end of 2025, 67 journalists had lost permanent accreditations in the Casa Rosada.

On Thursday, April 23, the Argentine Journalism Forum (FOPEA) filed a formal complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, addressed to the president of the IACHR, Edgar Stuardo Ralón Orellana. The document details that the official decision to disqualify press workers who cover the Executive Branch in a generalized manner violates international standards of freedom of expression.

The presentation was not an isolated movement. It gives continuity to the proposals that FOPEA initiated in November 2025 in Miami, during a public hearing of the Commission's 194th Session. At that time, the entity had already warned commissioners about the risks to journalism in Argentina. The IACHR had also received a complaint from the Association of Argentine Journalistic Entities (ADEPA) that same month for "censorship."

On Monday, April 27, the IACHR's Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (SLR) made public its concern and urged the Argentine State to review the restriction, demanding that it be adjusted to inter-American standards. It is the first formal international response to the conflict and a diplomatic blow of relevance for the government.

The conflict between the government of Javier Milei and the press did not begin with TN's lenses. Since the inauguration of the president in December 2023, the tension has been escalating under various modalities: public attacks on the reputation of journalists, accusations that journalism is part of "the caste", the installation of the narrative that most journalism is corrupt and the selective withdrawal of accreditations.

In March 2024, Milei accused journalists of being infiltrated agents of Cuba and Venezuela. In the following months, selective restrictions and attacks on press workers during operations were recorded. By the end of 2025, according to FOPEA, 67 professionals had already lost their permanent accreditations at Casa Rosada.

The total closure of April 24, 2026 represents, according to the historical journalists of the government headquarters themselves, an unprecedented event in Argentine history, even in the face of the military dictatorship of 1976–1983. The head of FOPEA, Fernando Stanich, remarked that although pressures on the press have existed in different administrations, it had never been prohibited to enter the main area of operation of the Executive Branch by name and surname.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression have repeatedly established that the access of the press to government spaces is a basic condition for the exercise of freedom of expression and citizen control. Limiting such access across the board, without proportionate justification or reliance on reasonable security standards, constitutes an illegitimate restriction on the right to information.

FOPEA maintains that the Casa Rosada, as the seat of the country's political power, has the character of an institutional public space. Its closure to the press not only affects journalists but also directly affects the right of citizens to access information about government acts, a pillar of the democratic system recognized by the American Convention on Human Rights.

Highway Case: Justice orders the confiscation of assets of Cristina Kirchner and the other convicted

⚖️ Highway Case: Justice orders the confiscation of assets of Cristina Kirchner and the other convicted

In an unprecedented ruling that marks a milestone in the recovery of assets from corruption, the Court determined the beginning of the execution of assets of the main convicts in the so-called Highway Case. The measure seeks to cover the economic damage against the National State, estimated at billions of pesos.

The judicial decision instructs the corresponding agencies to identify, appraise and execute the assets of those found guilty of fraudulent administration. Among those affected by the measure are former Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, businessman Lázaro Báez and former officials of the Public Works portfolio.

The ruling stresses that the confiscation is not only an accessory sanction, but a restorative justice tool necessary to correct the diversion of public funds that should have been allocated to road infrastructure in the province of Santa Cruz.

Justice has set its sights on a complex web of properties and values that include:

"The execution of these assets represents a fundamental step in the fight against financial impunity," said judicial sources close to the process.

The technical breakdown of the assets ordered for confiscation by the Federal Court of Criminal Cassation amounts to a record figure of $684,990,350,139.86 (approximately 537 million dollars). According to the latest expert report and the judicial resolution of April 2026, the auction will affect a total of 111 properties and various financial assets distributed among the main convicts.

TWO YEARS OF RESISTANCE: THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY RETURNS TO THE STREETS

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/76/Marcha_Federal_Universitaria_-_23A_-_Argentina_%282024%29.jpg/1200px-Marcha_Federal_Universitaria_-_23A_-_Argentina_%282024%29.jpg

▲ Federal University March on April 23, 2024. More than 430,000 people throughout the country. Source: Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0

This April 23 marks exactly two years since the first Federal University March, that mobilization that brought together approximately 430,000 people throughout the Argentine territory and that forced the government of President Javier Milei to sit down to dialogue with rectors, unions and students. It was an unprecedented postcard in the country's recent history: faculties in the dark, classrooms empty, and hundreds of thousands of citizens marching in defense of free, public higher education.

Two years later, the conflict was not only not resolved, but deepened. May 12, 2026 will be the date of the fourth federal march, jointly convened by the National Interuniversity Council (CIN), the Trade Union Front of National Universities and the Argentine University Federation (FUA), under the slogan: "Federal march for education, the public university and national science".

The data speak for themselves and are as forceful as they are alarming. According to the CIN, fund transfers to public universities fell by 45.6% since 2023 in real terms. Teaching and non-teaching salaries, which represent 90% of the university budget, have accumulated a loss of between 30% and 50% of purchasing power since November 2023, when Milei won the presidential runoff.

"Salaries are the lowest in 40 years," said Clara Chevalier, secretary general of Conadu. For its part, the Federation of University Teachers (Fedun) reported that the sector's revenues have been falling in real terms for 17 consecutive months. In March 2026, while official inflation was 3.4%, the government ordered a wage increase of 1.7% – exactly half of what is needed to maintain purchasing power.

Added to this is the collapse of Progresar student scholarships: according to the National Economy Research Center (CIEN), between 2023 and 2025 the number of beneficiaries fell by 62.4%, while the purchasing power of each scholarship fell by 46.5%. To return to December 2023 levels, investment in this area should grow by 63%.

At the center of the conflict is the University Financing Law No. 27,795, sanctioned by the National Congress on August 22, 2024. The regulation establishes the monthly update for inflation of the salary and operating expenses of national state universities, and implies a 51% increase for teachers and non-teachers in order to recover what has been lost since December 2023.

The Executive Branch vetoed the law in October 2024, which triggered the second federal march. In an unprecedented legislative maneuver, Congress rejected the veto in December. However, the government enacted the rule without implementing it, citing "lack of funds." The answer came from the Courts: on December 23, 2025, the judge of first instance Martín Cormick ordered immediate compliance with articles 5 and 6 of the law, referring to salary and scholarship updates. The State appealed the measure.

On March 31, 2026, Chamber III of the National Court of Appeals in Federal Administrative Litigation confirmed the ruling of the first instance and ratified the precautionary measure in favor of the universities. The sentence was signed by judges Sergio Gustavo Fernández and Jorge Eduardo Morán. Even so, the government maintains the non-compliance.

Rectors, unions and students speak with a common voice, although from different positions. From the CIN, the organization that brings together rectors from all over the country, Rector Bartolacci summarized the collective feeling: "We are all aware of the economic situation of the country and that there are many sectors that are having a very bad time. But we are demanding a decent salary for those who have the responsibility of training the future generations of professionals that Argentina needs."

On the union front, Patricio Grande, professor at the National University of Luján and member of the executive board of Conadu Histórica, explained the wage urgency: to recover the purchasing power of December 2023, workers should receive more than a 50% increase. On the other hand, the general secretary of Fedun, Daniel Ricci, expanded the call for the march: he asked that it not only be from the university sector, but that it convene the whole of society.

From the student sector, Joaquín Carvalho, president of the FUA and student at the National University of Rosario, warned: "The government does not respond to the need to invest in education, and is pushing the situation towards a scenario of great conflict." Carvalho stressed that the bloc between rectors, unions and students remains solid.

In the weeks leading up to the new march, different faculties throughout the country implemented a new form of protest called "Japanese-style strike": instead of being absent, teaching and non-teaching workers set up free health care posts at the doors of the faculties. In the City of Buenos Aires, thousands of people received dental care, dental prostheses were made, glasses were distributed and blood tests were performed. In addition, 500 pets were cared for by university veterinarians.

In response to the complaints, the Executive proposed in February 2026 an alternative project that does not repeal Law No. 27,795 but modifies its central points. The official text offers an increase of 12.3% in three installments (March, July and September), well below the 51% established by the current law. In addition, it contemplates the updating of operating expenses only if inflation exceeds 14.5%, without recognizing the losses accumulated during 2024.

The proposal was flatly rejected by the university system, and at the close of this edition it had no date for parliamentary treatment. Rector Olmedo, from the National University of Formosa, summarized the situation: "They are reaching a peak where many universities no longer want to open the Faculties because the budget is not updated."

🏛️ NATIONAL POLICY | ⏱️ Estimated reading time: 6 minutes (~1,100 words)

Electoral Reform in Argentina: Milei promotes the elimination of the PASO, Clean Record and changes in party financing

President Javier Milei announced from Israel that he was sending to Congress a bill that could radically redesign the rules of the democratic game before the 2027 legislative elections

Photo caption: President Javier Milei announced the electoral reform from Israel, where he participated in the Israeli Independence Day event with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Buenos Aires, April 22, 2026. — President Javier Milei shook the political chessboard on Tuesday by announcing, through a message published on the social network X from Israel, the immediate sending to the National Congress of a comprehensive electoral reform project. The initiative contemplates three backbones: the definitive elimination of the Primary, Open, Simultaneous and Mandatory (PASO); a reformulation of the system of financing political parties; and the reinstatement of the figure of Clean Record – already rejected by the Senate in May 2025 – to prevent people convicted of corruption from accessing national elective positions.

The announcement came as Milei was closing his third trip to Israel, where he participated in the celebrations for the anniversary of that state's independence and was seen with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The president sang the song "Libre", by Nino Bravo, before a crowd that cheered him, on a day that also marked a strong sign of foreign policy.

📌 Context: What are the PASO and why does Milei seek to eliminate them?

The Open, Simultaneous and Mandatory Primaries were created in 2009, during the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, through Law No. 26,571. Since then, they have been held on the third Sunday of August of each election year and enable all citizens – regardless of their affiliation – to participate in the internal selection of candidates of each political force.

Its operation fulfills three central functions: to order the internal competition of the parties, to enable competition between lists within the same force and to act as an electoral filter prior to the general election. However, the system is subject to sustained criticism of the cost to the public treasury of organizing an additional election whose result, in many cases, does not define truly competitive candidates.

During the 2025 legislative elections, Milei's government managed to suspend the PASO through a measure approved in the Senate on February 20 of that year. Now, the Executive is going a step further and proposing its permanent elimination from the Argentine electoral system.

💰 The debate over political financing

The second axis of the reform aims to transform the structure of economic support of party activity. The current system contemplates public financing for campaigns, free spaces for electoral advertising and ordinary operation of the parties, complemented by private contributions with regulated ceilings.

The proposal of the Executive Branch seeks to reduce the weight of the State in this scheme, in line with the cut in public spending that constitutes the core of the economic policy of the libertarian administration. If the change prospers, financing would tend to move to private sources or internal resources of each force, with a direct impact on the campaign structure and party organization, especially for the smaller parties.

🧾 Clean Record: a battle that the ruling party wants to reopen

The Clean Record initiative — which would prevent those convicted in the second instance from running for national elective office — has a recent and controversial legislative history. The bill obtained half approval in the Chamber of Deputies, but was rejected in the Senate in May 2025 in an extremely close vote.

The defeat in the upper house was marked by the vote of the missionary senators of the Renewal, Carlos Arce and Sonia Rojas Decut, whose position ended up tipping the balance against the ruling party. The law, if approved, would have left former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, convicted in the second instance in corruption cases, out of competence.

Now, the Casa Rosada is relaunching the proposal, but this time integrated into the broader electoral reform package, with the expectation that the political momentum and the pre-electoral context of 2027 will generate more favorable conditions for its approval.

🗣️ Political reactions

From the ruling bloc, Deputy Lilia Lemoine was one of the first to come out to defend the initiative on social networks: "The vote of each deputy and each senator in this project will be very revealing. Those who oppose it will make it clear that they see politics as a business," he said.

The Secretary of Communication, Javier Lanari, was in the same vein: "No good political party can oppose this agenda," he said, aiming to install a political cost for those who reject the reform.

However, in the corridors of Congress the panorama is more complex. Parliamentary sources from the PRO and the UCR expressed reservations regarding the elimination of the PASO, arguing that the mechanism, despite its costs, allows them to resolve their internal conflicts and legitimize themselves in the eyes of the electorate. "If we go together in Buenos Aires, we will have to resolve it this way or Karina (Milei) will come and want to impose the candidate on us," said a radical legislator off the record.

In the entourage of the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Martín Menem, it was learned that the deputy from La Rioja had asked the Casa Rosada to delay sending the bill until he was certain about the votes necessary to approve it. Milei's own early announcement from Israel ended that possibility.

🔮 Perspectives: What can happen in Congress?

The formal submission of the bill opens a stage of intense negotiation in Congress. The ruling party knows that it faces two simultaneous fronts: the resistance of its own allies – PRO and radicalism – to the elimination of the PASO, and the need to recompose the support that was lacking to approve Ficha Limpia last year.

Political analysts consulted by this newspaper agree that the legislative treatment is unlikely to take place before the second half of the year, considering that in the first half of the year the focus will be on the World Cup in the United States, Canada and Mexico, and that the proximity to the electoral calendar will condition the willingness of the blocs to vote on structural changes.

The government's bet seems to be long-term: to install public debate, make visible the position of each legislator and build political capital for 2027. "Impunity is over. The is over," Milei repeated, making it clear that the axis of the upcoming campaign already has a name.

🔗 Sources and references

More than five years after the death of Argentina's greatest football idol, the country's justice system made a second attempt to answer the question that divides a nation: did Diego Maradona die of natural causes, or was he abandoned by the very people paid to keep him alive?

Defendants charged

120

Witnesses expected

8–25

Years in prison if convicted

2nd

Trial (first was annulled)

⚖️A historic second trial begins

On Tuesday, April 14, 2026, the courts of San Isidro — in the greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area — opened their doors to a trial Argentina had been waiting for since the first proceedings collapsed in scandal nearly a year earlier. Seven healthcare professionals once again took their seats before the Oral Criminal Court No. 7 to answer for the death of Diego Armando Maradona, which occurred on November 25, 2020.

The courtroom was packed. Outside, some fifty people carrying Argentine flags and signs demanded "Justice for D10S" — a play on Maradona's iconic No. 10 jersey and "Dios," the Spanish word for God. Inside, daughters Dalma, Gianinna, and Jana Maradona, together with former partner Verónica Ojeda, watched from the front row as proceedings began in what promises to be the final act of a legal saga without precedent in football history.

"Diego Maradona began to die 12 hours before his actual death. Anyone who had thought to transfer him to a clinic in a car or ambulance during his final week would have saved his life."
— Patricio Ferrari, lead prosecutor

👥The seven defendants: who they are

All seven face charges of homicide with eventual intent (homicidio simple con dolo eventual) — the legal concept that applies when someone pursues a course of action knowing it could result in another person's death. All have declared themselves innocent and remain free pending the verdict.

Leopoldo Luque

🧠 Neurosurgeon · Personal physician

Agustina Cosachov

🩺 Treating psychiatrist

Carlos Díaz

🧠 Psychologist · Addiction treatment

Ricardo Omar Almirón

💉 Nurse

Mariano Perroni

👨‍⚕️ Nursing coordinator

Nancy Edith Forlini

📋 Medical coordinator (insurance)

Pedro Di Spagna

🩺 General practitioner

ℹ️

Eighth defendant: Nurse Dahiana Madrid requested a jury trial and will be tried in a separate proceeding whose date has not yet been set.

📋The prosecution: "a diabolical environment"

Lead prosecutor Patricio Ferrari pulled no punches in his opening statement. He described the medical team as "a bunch of amateurs" who committed "all kinds of omissions" and created what he called "cruel" conditions for their patient. According to the prosecution, Maradona was in agony for at least 12 hours with no one making the decision to transfer him to a hospital.

Plaintiff attorney Fernando Burlando, representing daughters Dalma and Gianinna, went further still: "Diego Armando Maradona was murdered." Burlando argued that during Maradona's home convalescence at the San Andrés gated community in Tigre, the icon was "surrounded by strangers" and that between November 11 and 25, 2020, "no one ever listened to Maradona's heart." Attorney Pablo Jurado, representing Maradona's sisters, called it "the chronicle of a death foretold."

Stadium named after Diego Armando Maradona in La Plata, Argentina

📷 The stadium in La Plata, renamed in honour of the football legend. Archive image.

🛡️The defence: "he died of a heart attack"

Defence lawyers categorically rejected the charges. Francisco Oneto, defending neurosurgeon Leopoldo Luque, announced that the trial would prove Maradona died of a heart attack stemming from his pre-existing medical conditions, and not from medical negligence.

Vadim Mischanchuk, lawyer for psychiatrist Cosachov, pointed to Maradona himself: "Diego had a determining role in decisions about his own health." He stressed that there was no "criminal plan" to cause his death. Roberto Rallín, another of Luque's attorneys, went as far as claiming that if Maradona were alive today, he "would ask that they not be convicted."

"If there is one thing that has been definitively ruled out, it is a deliberate criminal plan to kill Maradona."
— Vadim Mischanchuk, defence attorney for Agustina Cosachov

📰Why a second trial? The documentary scandal explained

To understand why this is a second trial, one must go back to May 2025. The first proceedings, which had accumulated more than 20 hearings and 44 witness testimonies over nearly three months, were declared null and void following an unprecedented scandal.

Judge Julieta Makintach, one of the three magistrates presiding over the case, was found to have taken part in an unauthorized documentary about the trial, tentatively titled "Divine Justice" (Justicia Divina). Footage showed the judge walking through courthouse corridors with electronic music playing in the background, before being interviewed at her desk — all filmed using cameras that had been secretly smuggled into the hearings.

The scandal led to Makintach's removal from office following impeachment proceedings in November 2025. Everything that had been done in the first trial was annulled. Zero. Back to square one. Argentina had to start again.

⚠️

Institutional impact: The annulment invalidated 20 hearings and 44 testimonies, including emotional statements from Maradona's children. Defence lawyers argue their clients are being "prosecuted twice for the same cause."

🕐Timeline of the case

⚽

November 2020

Diego Maradona dies

On November 25, Maradona dies of cardiac arrest and acute pulmonary oedema at the San Andrés gated community in Tigre, two weeks after brain surgery for a subdural hematoma.
🔍

2020–2023

Criminal investigation

Authorities investigate the circumstances of Maradona's death. A medical review board concludes he began dying at least 12 hours before his heart stopped.
⚖️

2024 – May 2025

First oral trial

Trial begins with 7 defendants. Over 20 hearings and 44 testimonies are heard, including those of Maradona's daughters.
💥

May – November 2025

Scandal and annulment

Judge Makintach is found to have participated in the "Divine Justice" documentary. The trial is annulled. Makintach is removed from the bench in November.
🔄

March – April 2026

Second oral trial

The process restarts from scratch under a new three-judge panel: Gaig, Ortolani and Rolón. The first hearing takes place on April 14, 2026.
🏛️

June – July 2026 (estimated)

Verdict expected

The tribunal aims to deliver its verdict before the mid-year judicial recess, potentially as early as June 2026.

👨‍⚖️The new judges: under the microscope

The three magistrates now presiding are Alberto Gaig, Alberto Ortolani, and Pablo Rolón, members of the Oral Criminal Court No. 7 of San Isidro. Luque himself had reportedly preferred a jury trial — a request that was denied — though his attorney expressed confidence in the new panel's impartiality.

Hearings are held on Tuesdays and Thursdays, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., at the courthouse on Ituzaingó Street 340 in San Isidro. The witness list has been trimmed to roughly 90–120 names — down from a proposed 170 — and includes medical experts, family members, police officers, and people from Maradona's inner circle.

💔The family: "We want Diego to rest in peace"

Verónica Ojeda, mother of Dieguito Fernando — Maradona's 13-year-old youngest son — told reporters outside the courthouse: "That's what we all need: justice for Diego. We want to live in peace and for Diego to rest in peace." Her partner and family lawyer, Mario Baudry, was more direct: "I hope they are found guilty. And I hope the judges are severe with Luque, Cosachov and Díaz."

Baudry also pointed to the emotional weight of having to relive the ordeal: "For the victims, going through this again is hard, especially while also having to look after a 13-year-old boy." Daughters Dalma, Gianinna, and Jana attended the first hearing and will be called to testify again.

"We want to live in peace and for Diego to rest in peace."
— Verónica Ojeda, Maradona's former partner and mother of Dieguito Fernando

🔬The medical facts of the case

Maradona died of cardiac arrest and acute pulmonary oedema, against a clinical backdrop that included chronic kidney disease, liver cirrhosis, respiratory failure, and long-standing addictions to cocaine and alcohol. He had undergone surgery on November 3, 2020 at the Clínica Olivos for a subdural hematoma — a blood clot pressing on the brain. He was discharged on November 11 and transferred to a house in the San Andrés gated community in Tigre to recover under home medical supervision.

The medical review board convened by the courts determined that Maradona had begun dying at least 12 hours before he was found unresponsive, and that he displayed unmistakable signs of prolonged agony. Prosecutors argue that a timely transfer to a hospital could have saved his life.

Regarding the conditions of the home convalescence, the prosecution stated there was "no medical equipment, not even a bandage" and described the setup as "deficient, marked by omissions." The defence counters that the treatment plan was "agreed upon and appropriate" to Maradona's condition, and that the footballer himself made decisions about his care.

🌐A case that transcends borders

The trial over Maradona's death is not merely a criminal proceeding: it is a mirror through which Argentina examines its healthcare system, its judiciary, and its relationship with its own legends. The football world watches from outside. AFP, Reuters, CNN, Al Jazeera and dozens of international outlets covered the opening of the second trial in real time.

Whatever verdict is ultimately reached will have implications far beyond prison sentences. It will set a precedent on medical accountability in Argentina and define how far negligence can go before it becomes a crime.

The Number 10 spent his whole life asking the world to remember him. Now he waits, from somewhere beyond, for justice to speak its final word.

#Maradona #MaradonaTrial #SanIsidro #Argentina #MedicalNegligence #LeopoldoLuque #ArgentinaJustice #DiegoMaradona2026

📅	Increase date: Thursday, May 14, 2026, from midnight
💰	Percentage: 1% in all YPF fuels nationwide
🤝	Advertiser: Horacio Marín — President and CEO of YPF
🔒	Post buffer: Price freeze for an additional 45 days
🛢️	Context: U.S.-Iran war conflict / Strait of Hormuz
🛢️	Brent to announcement: Trading above $100 a barrel
📈	Cumulative 2026: More than 83% in some places in the country since January

Period / Event	Percentage increase	Naphtha Super (CABA ref.)	Key context
January 2026	Minimum stability/micro-adjustments	$1,040 – $1,100 approx.	Low inflation, Brent in USD 73 zone
February 2026	~2,5% acumulado (micropricing)	$1,609 – $1,674	Pre-war; EcoGo Index: 102
28 Feb – Conflict begins	Start of the US-Iran War	Brent jumps from $73 to $102+	Hormuz Quasi-Blocked
1st fortnight of March	~7% cumulative	$1,747 – $1,999	First impact of the conflict
28 feb – 28 mar (Romano Group)	Super: +17% • Infinia: +15% • Diesel: +19%	$ 1,999 (YPF cap)	Biggest increase of the year in a month
April 2026 (1st)	Freezing — buffer 45 days	$ 1.999 (YPF) • $ 2.069+ (Axion/Shell)	Reduction in indoor consumption
1 May 2026	Fuel tax +0.5% (Decree 302/2026)	Impact: +$ 11 naphtha / +$ 10 diesel	Partial CPI update (INDEC)
May 14, 2026 — TODAY	1% (with new buffer 45 days)	~$ 2,019 (post-upload estimate)	Brent surpasses USD 100; Unstable Hormuz

Company	Super Naphtha	Nafta Premium	Diesel
YPF	$2,019 (est.)	$2,245 (est. Infinia)	$2,280 (est.)
Shell (Raizen)	$2,099 – $2,120	$2,379 (V-Power)	$ 2.439 (V-Power Diesel)
Axion Energy	$2,069 – $2,090	$ 2.359 (Quantium)	$2,169+ (Diesel X10)

Milestone of the conflict	Date	Brent (USD/barrel)	Estimated local impact
Start bombing of Iran	Feb 28, 2026	$73 → $102 in hours	+6% gasoline in 10 days
Hormuz almost paralyzed	Mar 2026	USD 102 – USD 110	Monthly increases of 7%
Brent intraday peak	Apr 30, 2026	US$126.41 (max from Mar 2022)	Emergency Tax Decrees
Stabilized Brent (relative)	May 2026	USD 100 – USD 110	Buffer + 1% suba YPF

Scenario	Main condition	Projected Brent	Suba esperada post-buffer
Optimistic (A)	Normalized U.S.-Iran/Hormuz Agreement	USD 75 – 85	No significant increase; possible casualty
Base (B)	Protracted but stable conflict	USD 90 – 105	Between 10% and 15% in H2 2026
Pessimistic (C)	War escalation / effective closure Hormuz	US$120+	25% or more; possible shortages
Very pessimistic (D)	Global supply breakdown	US$140+	Emergency adjustments; Local decoupling

📜 What is RIGI: Definition and Legal Framework

⚙️ How It Works: The VPU and the Accession Process

✅ The Benefits: The RIGI Benefits Package

💰 Tax Benefits

🚢 Customs Benefits

💱 Exchange Benefits

⚖️ Legal Stability: 30 Years of Fixed Rules

⚠️ The Other Side: Criticisms, Risks, and Controversies

💸 The Fiscal Impact Argument

🌱 The Environmental Issue

⚖️ The ICSID Problem

📈 Approved Projects: RIGI in Real Numbers

🗓️ The 2026 Extension: Signals from the Government

📊 RIGI vs. General Regime: How Much the Benefit Is Worth

⚖️ The Balance: Pros and Cons in Perspective

🗣️ Voices of the Debate

🔭 Conclusion: A High-Stakes, High-Stakes Experiment

📚 Sources and References

⚖️ Highway Case: Justice orders the confiscation of assets of Cristina Kirchner and the other convicted

📌 Context: What are the PASO and why does Milei seek to eliminate them?

💰 The debate over political financing

🧾 Clean Record: a battle that the ruling party wants to reopen

🗣️ Political reactions

🔮 Perspectives: What can happen in Congress?

🔗 Sources and references

Second trial over the death of
Diego Armando Maradona:
a new attempt at justice

⚖️A historic second trial begins

👥The seven defendants: who they are

📋The prosecution: "a diabolical environment"

🛡️The defence: "he died of a heart attack"

📰Why a second trial? The documentary scandal explained

🕐Timeline of the case

👨‍⚖️The new judges: under the microscope

💔The family: "We want Diego to rest in peace"

🔬The medical facts of the case

🌐A case that transcends borders

🕰️ Timing	Date	What happened
1	January 2026	Stable pricing with minimal micro-adjustments. EcoGo index: 100. Brent: USD 73.
2	26 February	Brent closes at USD 73.20. It is the last day of calm.
3	28 February	US-Israeli bombing of Iran. Hormuz almost blocked. Brent jumps to $102.
4	March 2026	Naphtha up ~17% in the month. Diesel +19%. Consumption begins to fall in the interior.
5	1st April	YPF activates the first 45-day buffer. It freezes prices to curb the fall in demand.
6	30 April	Brent touches USD 126. Government publishes Decree 302/2026: fuel tax +0.5% in May.
7	1 May	The 0.5% tax increase comes into force. Rest of the adjustment postponed to June.
8	May 14 — TODAY	YPF rises 1% and launches new buffer 45 days. Cumulative 2026: ~85% in some places.

SEO Element	Value / Recommendation
Title Tag (60 car.)
Meta description (155 car.)
Keyword principal	YPF 2026 fuel increase
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Estimated reading time	7 minutes (1,350 words approx.)
Content Update

📅	Date:	May 2026 — ongoing coverage
⏱️	Approx. reading:	10 to 12 minutes (≈ 2,200 words)
⚖️	Judicial case:	Illicit enrichment — Judge Ariel Lijo / Pollicita Prosecutor
💳	Related case:	Nucleoeléctrica Corporate Card — Fiscal Ramiro González
🏛️	Status:	Investigation opened — no formal indictment of Adorni (May 2026)
🔴	Political impact:	2.5 million mentions in 59 days — drop >10 pts in Milei's image

2024	Adorni buys a lot in the country Indio Cuá (Exaltación de la Cruz) registered in the name of his wife Bettina Angeletti for a declared value of $120,000 — a price that real estate operators in the area describe as significantly low.
Nov. 2025	The Justice opens a formal investigation for alleged illicit enrichment. Federal Judge Ariel Lijo and prosecutor Gerardo Pollicita take the case. The banking and financial secrecy of Adorni and Angeletti before ARCA (former AFIP) is lifted.
Dec. 2025	First witnesses testify about the origin of the funds to buy the property. The names of two retirees and two police officers who would have lent a total of $300,000 to the couple emerge.
Mar. 2026	Judge Lijo lifts the tax secrecy before ARBA (Buenos Aires) to access tax information on the couple's real estate. The case adds up to 18 detected trips – national and international – made by Adorni and his wife.
Apr. 2026	Adorni appears before the Chamber of Deputies. He declares: "I did not commit any crime and I am going to prove it in Justice." The Peronist bloc announces a motion of censure – Article 101 of the Constitution, never applied since 1994.
4 May. 2026	The contractor Matías Tabar testifies for three hours before the prosecutor Pollicita. He claims to have charged $245,000 in cash — without invoices — for repairs that include floors, walls, a swimming pool and a waterfall in the garden. He hands over his cell phone for an expert's test.
5 May. 2026	WhatsApp chats between Adorni and Tabar are leaked. Adorni would have contacted the witness before his statement. Deputy Marcela Pagano requests the arrest of the Chief of Staff invoking the Irurzun doctrine for alleged obstruction.
6 May. 2026	Judge Lijo lifts the tax secrecy before ARBA. The case adds the intervention of the DATIF (Directorate of Technical-Financial Assistance of the Attorney General's Office) for the asset analysis. Journalist Marcel Grandío — with whom Adorni traveled to Punta del Este by private plane — is also under the magnifying glass.
8 May. 2026	Federal prosecutor Ramiro González charges Demian Reidel – Milei's former chief adviser and former president of Nucleoeléctrica – for the use of corporate cards in nightclubs, hotels and free shops abroad. The expenses, known thanks to a management report presented by Adorni himself, add up to more than 50 million pesos.
9 May. 2026	Adorni breaks the silence in a streaming interview: "They beat me because I'm a piece of Milei." He ratifies that he will not resign. The Government admits for the first time the negative impact of the case on the image of the President.

DATE		FACT
06/03/2026	📜	Congress approves and publishes Law 27,802 on Labor Modernization. Structural reforms to Argentine labor law.
March 2026	⚖️	The CGT files a declaratory action of unconstitutionality and requests a precautionary measure before the Labor Justice.
30/03/2026	🔴	Judge Raúl H. Ojeda (JNT No. 63) suspends 82 articles of the law by means of a precautionary measure. Alarms at Casa Rosada.
16/04/2026	📩	The Treasury Attorney General's Office presents the per saltum to the Supreme Court, seeking to bypass lower instances.
23/04/2026	🟢	Chamber VIII of the Labor Chamber restores the validity of the 82 articles by granting suspensive effect to the State's appeal.
28/04/2026	🏛️	The Federal Administrative Court orders the transfer of the case to the federal jurisdiction, displacing Judge Ojeda.
05/05/2026	⏱️	The Federal Court gives Ojeda 24 hours to submit the file. The judge had ignored the previous order.
07/05/2026	🚫	The Supreme Court declares per saltum inadmissible. Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz signed. The case is still in lower instances.

	ACTOR	REPRESENTATIVE/MEMBERS	ROLE IN THE CONFLICT
🏛️	Supreme Court	Rosatti, Lorenzetti, Rosenkrantz	It declared the per saltum inadmissible for not complying with the requirements of art. 257 bis CPCCN.
🏛️	Treasury Procurement	Sebastián Amerio	He filed the per saltum on 16/04. He represents the Executive in the judicial dispute.
⚖️	Judge Ojeda (JNT N°63)	Raúl H. Ojeda	It suspended 82 articles on 30/03 by means of a precautionary measure. He resisted orders from the Chamber.
🤝	CGT	Sola, Argüello, Jerónimo	He filed the action of unconstitutionality that triggered the judicial conflict.
🏦	Contentious Chamber Adm.	Room IV	He ordered the case to be transferred to the federal jurisdiction and gave Ojeda 24 hours to comply.
📋	Chamber of Labor	Room VIII – González y Pesino	It restored the validity of the 82 articles on 04/23 by giving suspensive effect to the State's appeal.
🌾	Argentine Rural Society	-	He appeared before the Justice to support the validity of Law 27,802.
⚙️	Min. of Justicia Mahiques	Juan B. Mahiques	He actively intervened to remove the case from the labor jurisdiction and transfer it to the federal jurisdiction.

	ISSUE	STATE	DETAIL
✅	Law 27.802	Current	The labour reform has been in force since 23/04/2026.
🔴	For Saltum	Rejected	The Supreme Court declared it inadmissible on 07/05/2026.
⚖️	Ojeda Precautionary Measure	No effect	Chamber VIII suspended it by granting suspensive effect to the State's appeal.
🏛️	Competent jurisdiction	Contentious Adm.	The case was transferred out of the labor jurisdiction to the federal level.
📋	Case background	Pending	The constitutionality of the law has not yet been resolved on its merits.
📍	Next step	Federal Court No. 12	The federal administrative court must resolve the constitutional merits.

🏷️	SEO Title (H1)
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🔑	Primary keywords
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📅	Publication date	May 7, 2026 \| Continuous Update
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Bidder	Amount offered	Position
🥇 Genneia + Edison Transmission	US$ 356.17 M	1st offer
🥈 Central Puerto	US$ 301 M	2nd offer
🥉 Edenor	US$ 230 M	3rd offer

Company / Asset	Sector	Process status
⚡ Citelec (Transener)	Electric transport	🟡 Open bids — decision pending
💧 AySA	Water and sanitation	🟡 Contract approved — tender coming soon
🚂 Belgrano Cargas	Freight rail	🔵 Process started (Jul. 2025)
✈️ Intercargo	Airport services	🟡 Authorized sale 100%
🏭 C. San Martín Thermal	Power generation	🔵 Under evaluation
🏭 C. Térmica M. Belgrano	Power generation	🔵 Under evaluation
🏛️ Casa de la Moneda	Banknote printing	🔵 Included in schedule
🚆 SOFSE (pasajeros)	Passenger Rail	⚪ Pending start

Date	Fact
Sunday 19/04	The program And tomorrow what? of TN issues a report filmed with smart glasses in the internal corridors of the Casa Rosada. Journalists Luciana Geuna and Ignacio Salerno are its protagonists.
Tuesday 22/04	The Military House, headed by Brigadier General Sebastián Ibáñez, filed a criminal complaint in Federal Court No. 4 (Judge Ariel Lijo) for alleged disclosure of political and military secrets (Articles 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code, sentences of 1 to 6 years). The accusation includes Geuna, Salerno, producers and directors of TN.
Thursday 24/04	The Secretariat of Communication, in charge of Javier Lanari, removes the fingerprints of some 60 accredited journalists from the biometric system of access to the Casa Rosada. The historic Press Room is empty for the first time in decades. Milei describes the measure as "excellent" and calls journalists in X "disgusting garbage."
Thursday 24/04	Opposition legislators (Paulón, Selva) try unsuccessfully to obtain official explanations at Casa Rosada. FOPEA issues a statement describing the measure as "extremely serious institutional." Euronews describes it as the first total veto of the press in Argentina's democratic history.
Thursday 24/04	An opposition deputy files a criminal complaint against Milei, Adorni, Lanari and Ibáñez for abuse of authority and restriction of freedom of the press.
Friday 25/04	Monsignor Jorge Lozano (Catholic Church) meets with accredited journalists in Plaza de Mayo, gives statements and asks for a "prompt solution." FOPEA announces that it is requesting an opinion from constitutionalists.
Thursday 23/04	FOPEA presents a formal complaint to the IACHR in Washington, addressed to President Edgar Stuardo Ralón Orellana.
Monday 27/04	The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression) of the IACHR makes public its concern and urges the Argentine State to review the restriction. There is no sign of a retreat from the government.
Tuesday 28/04	Manuel Adorni presents his first management report to the Chamber of Deputies. The conflict remains unresolved.

Actor	Position / Action
🌎 IACHR / Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression	It expressed public concern on 27/04 and urged the State to bring the measure into line with international standards of freedom of expression.
📰 FOPEA	Complaint to the IACHR (04/23), described the measure as "extremely serious institutional" and analyzes new legal actions. He requested an opinion from constitutionalists.
📺 ADEPA	He filed a complaint with the IACHR in November 2025 for "censorship." He supported FOPEA's position.
⛪ Catholic Church	Msgr. Jorge Lozano (Communication Commission, Episcopal Conf.) met twice with journalists in Plaza de Mayo and asked for a "prompt solution."
🏛️ Opposition deputies	Esteban Paulón (United Provinces) summoned journalists in the Chamber of Deputies. Sabrina Selva tried unsuccessfully to obtain an audience with Lanari. They describe the measure as "unconstitutional".
⚖️ Opposition criminal complaint	Filed against Milei, Adorni, Lanari and Ibáñez for abuse of authority and restriction of freedom of the press.
🌐 Euronews / AP	Euronews described the event as the first veto of access to journalists in Argentina's democratic history.
🏛️ Government / Milei	He ratified the closure. There are no signs of reversal. Adorni presents a management report in the Chamber of Deputies on 28/04.

📅 Date of the march	Tuesday, May 12, 2026 — Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires
🏛 Conveners	CIN · Union Front of National Universities · GO
📜 Law in dispute	University Financing Law No. 27,795
📉 Budget fall	45.6% since 2023 (CIN data)
💰 Loss of teacher salaries	Between 30% and 50% of purchasing power since Nov. 2023
⚖️ Latest court ruling	Cont. Camera Adm. Fed. — March 31, 2026: Ruling in favor of universities

🏛 APR 2024	1st Federal University March — April 23, 2024. Approximately 430,000 people throughout the country. The government agreed to negotiate and granted a 270% increase in operating expenses.
📜 AUG 2024	Congress approves the University Financing Law No. 27,795 (August 22, 2024). The Executive threatens with a veto.
✋ OCT 2024	2nd Federal March: against the presidential veto. The government suspended the application of the law by decree.
🏛 SEP 2025	3rd Federal March: Congress rejects the veto. The Executive Branch "promulgates" the law but does not apply it.
⚖️ MAR 2026	The Federal Administrative Court confirms the ruling of the first instance (March 31, 2026). The government is flouting the court order.
🚶 MAY 2026	4th Federal March called for May 12, 2026. Prior to this, a week of strike from April 27 to May 2 (Conadu Histórica).

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📅	Date	April 22, 2026
✍️	Sources	Infobae · Profile · The Capital · Diario Uno · Río Negro
🏷️	SEO keywords	Argentina's electoral reform, eliminate PASO, Clean Sheet, Milei Congress 2026
📂	Category	National Policy · Electoral System · Legislative